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Abstract 
 
Although the Parmenidean poem (late 6th-early 5th centuries BCE) is in epic meter and teems with 
vivid imagery, it has been translated into the domain of philosophy since its earliest reception. Within 
this domain it has traditionally been interpreted as the first "explicit and self -conscious argumentati-
on" of western philosophy (Gallop 1984, 3). Yet, the poem aims at persuasion and affect rather than 
logical demonstration (Smith 2003, 269-75). 
Working primarily with a sense of translation as critical reception, this paper articulates the history 
of a translational protocol that excises conceptual matter from linguistic form (Cassin 2010, 19; 
Batchelor 2010, 49-50), reducing the semantic range of the Parmenidean poem. Beginning with Zeno 
and Melissus (early 5th c BCE), a series of translations reduces the Parmenidean poem into a vehicle 
for a separable and fully translatable doctrine, stabilizing and homogenizing a thinking that otherwi-
se persists as polyvalent and heterogeneous.   
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1. Katabasis 
 
Thea – Goddess of uncertain identity, polyvalent,2 sings the Parmenidean poem,3 
which in the late archaic period was still a form of song. As a song, the Parmenidean poem 
                                                        
1 Known also as D. M. Spitzer. 
2 The goddess has been variously identified: "the Muse" and "the power of truth or of understanding or 
insight" (Fränkel 1975, 353); as both a repetition of Hesiodic Muses and as "the goddess of light" (Jaeger 
1947, 94, 107); "Aletheia" (Heidegger 1992, 5); "Constraint," "Fate," "Justice," "Persuasion" 
(Mourelatos 1970, 160); Valentine prefers a "notion of the divine female with flexibility and fluidity 
rather than fixity in her identity" (Valentine 2011, 109; and see the well-illustrated discussion 
underpinning this conclusion, 100-9). 
3 This manner of naming the work springs from Valentine's occasional use of the phrase "Parmenidean 
poem" (Valentine 2011, 17 et passim). Ιts use here for other "pre-Socratic philosophers" intends to 
problematize even at the level of names a simple author-text relationship with respect to the "fragments" 
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calls for performance and there is no knowledge of when, how, or by whom, in the vague 
range of Parmenides's own lifetime (approx. mid-late sixth to early-mid fifth centuries 
BCE) the poem was committed to writing. Like Xenophanes, Parmenides is part of a group 
of philosophers for whom the form of epic poetry shaped thinking as a performance. 
In dactylic hexameters the Parmenidean poem resounds as a richly polysemic song, ima-
ging a turbulent journey and an encounter with a feminine deity and configured initially as 
a first-person narrative and then as the goddess' speech in oratio recta. Take, for instance, 
the image of the deity Moira and her action in restricting being to a state of motionlessness: 
…for nothing else [either] is or will be 
Besides what-is, since it was just this that Fate [Moira] did shackle 
To be whole and changeless [or motionless; ἀκινητόν] (Parmenides fr. 8.36-38; transl. 
Gallop 1984, 71; interpolations in square brackets added) 
The image recoils on itself, challenging imagination: if nothing exists apart from being, 
how does Moira shackle being? Is Moira an abstract power ("Fate") whose force is like the 
restraint of shackles? In that case, what is her force (since the image would also indicate 
that Moira's force is other than that of restraint by shackles)? Further, even as the text as-
serts the immobility (ἀκινητόν) of being, the image of shackling suggests that, unfettered, 
being tends both to be not whole and to change. What explains such a tendency, the errant-
ry and resistance of being that must be forcibly restrained by a divine power?4 
Interpretation that attempts to identify "an extended argument" in which Parmenides 
elucidates ontological "properties and deduces them" (Graham 2012, 237) minimizes the 
language of the poem in favor of a putative argumentative content separable from the 
poetry, its polysemy, its images.5 As Smith has convincingly shown, however, the poem's 
refusal to release thinking from images and figures exposes attempts to make it do so 
(Smith 2003, 266, 271). Everywhere Smith turns in the poem's language he uncovers a 
paradigm not of "logical deduction" but rather of persuasion (Smith 2003, 278). Yet, the 
predominant way of engaging the poem advances from the notion that logical conclusions 
result in doctrine that can be simply restated and scrutinized. 
"Ghost in the kerameikos" traces the history of a translational protocol that excises 
conceptual matter from linguistic form, reducing via an instrumental view of language the 
                                                                                                                                              
preserved by later authors under the names of certain archaic and early classical thinkers. 
4 These questions serve as prompts for a paper by David M. Spitzer, "Hauntings: Fugitive Being and 
Destiny in the Parmenidean Poem," currently in progress. 
5 In Graham's commentary these lines, with one exception (the final two-and-a-half metrical feet of 8.38, 
which begin a new independent clause) are excluded. 
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semantic range of the Parmenidean poem. Extracting doctrine not only enables the poetry to 
be discarded, it also stabilizes and homogenizes a thinking that otherwise persists as 
polyvalent and heterogeneous. To carry out its task this paper works from an ample sense of 
translation that includes reception and interpretation, mobilizing the concepts of translative 
and translational actions (Spitzer 2017, 15): the former describes actions, events, or themes 
that can be understood as figuring or representing translation in some meaningful way; the 
latter has to do with specifically lingual transformations registered in Jakobson's threefold 
schema (Jakobson 2012, 127). Interpretation of translative moments is aided by a 
transfictional approach to texts such as that articulated and deployed by Arrojo whereby 
thematics of translation – in this case, mostly in philosophic texts – are identified and 
explored (Arrojo 2014, 46).  
 
2. Afterlife 
 
From the earliest reception(s) of the Parmenidean poem, two translational actions 
operate on the poem: first, the transformation into variegated and diverse forms; second, the 
translation of a provocative and challenging dynamics of form and content into a stable 
doctrine of prose. In Zenoan philosophy the two translational actions seem to merge and co-
operate, while in Melissoan philosophy the latter prevails. This convergence of two 
translational practices in Zenoan philosophy takes the form of "a defense of Parmenides' 
theses" that also generates creative thinking (Perilli 2018, 155). A paradox energizes 
Zenoan translation of the Parmenidean poem: on the one hand Zeno mortalizes thinking,  
centering on a human figure instead of the divine Thea of the Parmenidean poem;6 on the 
other hand, the connection with Zenoan writing as presented by Diogenes Laertius in a 
sense immortalizes philosophy, locating it in the swiftly emerging technology of writing 
away from the traditional orality of epic poetry.7 Each of these has a translational character. 
                                                        
6 The characters of Thea and Akhilleus have different roles in Parmenidean poem and Zenoan texts, but 
each one bears a central role as a figure around which thinking circulates. While in the Parmenidean 
poem Thea delivers the teaching, which is ascribed to her by the narrator, on another (narratological) 
level she is within the narrator's discourse. On this level Thea and Akhilleus converge – the latter 
operating as the narrator's (Zeno's) central image (see below for more on the centrality of Akhilleus).  
7 A third form of translation, not pursued in this paper, Zenoan philosophy applies to the Parmenidean 
poem seems to be from Parmenides's qualitative to quantitative senses of concepts like limitation and 
self-similarity (Palmer 2009, 196-98). In his challenge to the received notion that Zeno merely defends 
the positions of Parmenides as an Eleatic monist, Palmer suggests instead that Parmenides was as an 
influence either "tangential and indirect" or "essentially non-existent" (Palmer 2009, 205).  
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No longer divine, in Zenoan texts the thinking once sung assumes a complexion of human 
mortality. In place of the goddess of the Parmenidean song, Akhilleus, in whom dwells a 
genetics of divinity wrenched by the ankle down into the mortal realm, moves as the central 
figure in Zenoan thinking.8 Consonant with Zenoan formulation of paradoxes, Akhilleus's 
status in-between immortality and mortality, human and divine, intimates a paradox of 
untranslatability and translatability, which surfaces in two Zenoan images. First, Aristotle 
translates the Zenoan "so-called Achilles" paradox: 
the slowest, running [θέον], will never be left behind [καταληφθήσεται] by the fastest, 
since before that the pursuer must have come to the place the pursued set off from, so 
that the slower is necessarily always in front by some amount (Aristotle, Physics 
239b.14-18; transl. Sachs 1995, 164; interpolations added). 
On the one hand, the first runner perpetually eludes Akhilleus and suggests an unbridgeable 
gap between two, any two. As a translative image, the schism opens between various 
doubles in tension: between thought and speech, between orality and writing, between 
original and translation, where in each case Akhilleus represents the latter term of each pair. 
The scene in the Zenoan paradox strikes the chord of untranslatability and translatability. In 
the uncloseable distance constituting all relation the paradox refuses a translatability 
according to what Sallis has termed the "classical determination of translation" through 
which, because of the fully separable noetic and aesthetic regions, meaning is simply 
available in various languages (Sallis 2002, 62). Aristotle's phrasing of the paradox might 
register a sense of this refusal to be contained in a paraphrase or summary (a type of 
translation), an instance of the uncloseable distance the paradox speaks. The verb 
καταληφθήσεται drifts between καταλαμβάνω (grasp) and καταλείπω (left behind), while 
θέον remains suspended in its near homophony between the participle form θέον (running) 
and the accusative noun θεόν (the divinity), as if the divine element is spiriting away 
(theon) and evading the grasp (καταλαμβάνω) of a reductive translation. The language itself 
undermines the attempt at this type of translation and the resolution of the paradox. 
Counter to the "classical determination" and its dichotomy, and given the 
implication that the relation between Zeno and Parmenides was intimate and erotic 
(Diogenes Laertius IX.5.25), another translational practice takes place as a dialogic and 
                                                        
8 Even where absent, Akhilleus's presence is felt. For instance, in the third paradox the "flying arrow" 
reverberates with the fall of Akhilleus by arrow to the heel. See Jonathan Burgess' investigation on the 
traditions surrounding Akhilleus, his baptism for translation to immortality and, especially here, his 
death by an arrow wound to the ankle, which Burgess finds to have been "present in the Archaic Age and 
perhaps originated in pre-Homeric tradition" (Burgess 1995, 225). 
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irenic encounter. The erotics of intimacy does not operate without differences; rather, it brings 
differents into relations of intimacy that preserve the non-identical standing of each (Spivak 
1993, 183). In one of its valences, the paradoxically inflected untranslatability underlying the 
doxography of Zeno provokes, rather than prohibits, attempts at translation according to the 
"classical determination." The translative figurations in Zenoan philosophy summon the bind 
of translation as both necessary and impossible as well as the continual attempts unfolding 
from that bind (Derrida 1985, 171), while the array of reasonings that work towards multiple 
translations refuses the double,9 seeming to prefer instead a "series of endless versions that are 
always possible" (Littau 2000, 26). Inflected on the root of eros, the bind becomes an 
embrace. 
On the other hand, there is a sense in which Zenoan translations of the Parmenidean 
poem attempt a reproduction of sameness. This is one dimension of how Plato's Sokrates 
views the relation between the Zenoan paradoxes and the Parmenidean poem: they assert the 
same thing (ταὐτὸν) veiled by deceitful changes (Plato, Parmenides 128a.6-8).10 Aristotle too 
finds them interchangeable, even the same reasoning (ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος), with one exception 
noted (Aristotle, Physics 239b.14-20). This alteration suggests the presence of the same 
meaning repeated with inconsequential differences.11  
Similarly, with writing – the translation of oral song to written prose, in Diogenes 
Laertius's biography Zeno seems to figure a transition to written philosophy and an 
increasingly textualized climate, marking a rupture from history and temporality such as that 
Detienne identifies in the trajectory of philosophico-religious thought away from rhetoric 
(Detienne 1996, 129-34). Away from performative speech, the turn to the system of writing, 
pulsing in the imagery of Diogenes Laertius's doxographies, initiates a type of memory that 
"becomes a means for transcending and separating the soul from the body" (Detienne 1996, 
128). Indeed, the mutilated body of Zeno in Diogenes's accounts has been reduced to mere 
                                                        
9 Aristotle lays out four of Zenoan reasonings on movement and time (Aristotle, Physics 239b.5-
240a.18). Plato, in Parmenides, has Socrates illustrate the translations of Parmenides Zeno has 
undertaken, in which "he [Zeno] offers proofs that are very many and very great" (Plato, Parmenides 
128a.3-b6; trans. Whitaker 1996, 26; interpolation added). 
10 The passage reveals the inclination of Plato's Socrates to locate the one unifying thing, as he requests 
of Meno in a different dialogue, "in which they are all the same and do not differ from one another" 
(Plato, Meno 72c.3-4; trans. Grube/Cooper 2002, 61). But see Palmer, who brings out the ways Plato's 
Zeno challenges superficial interpretations of the Parmenidean poem such as that which Socrates 
advances in the dialogue (Palmer 2009, 191-93). 
11 With close readings of Borges's "Pierre Menard," the American Translators Association's Code of 
Ethics, and a passage from Alexander Fraser Tytler's Essay on the Principles of Translation, Arrojo has 
concisely unveiled the logic of sameness (Arrojo 2018, 20-23).  
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attire for the soul, disposable – translatable.12 In the first version, on the pretense of 
whispering a secret to Nearkhos, Zeno attacks Nearkhos's ear until the tyrant's supporters kill 
the assailant. According to the other version, Zeno's self-mutilation transforms his tongue into 
a political instrument – he is said both to have propelled it at Nearkhos, the tyrant of Hyele, 
and to have died as a consequence (Diogenes Laertius IX.5.26-27). In both cases the body 
parts – the ear and the tongue – can be read as presenting images of orality, which Zeno 
dispossesses and transforms into detachable instruments. Across the two versions reported by 
Diogenes, the body becomes a translative figure for this instrumentalization of language and 
an abrupt transition from oralcy to literacy, poetry to prose. 
What is more, Diogenes mentions the books of Zeno but does not mention writing in 
his entry on Parmenides, a detail that adds to Diogenes's accounts an undertone of a 
translation from the orality of singing to writing (Diogenes Laertius IX.5.26). Near the end of 
the Greek archaic period writing seems to have become "more ‘autonomous', more easily 
envisaged as an independent conveyor of information separate from oral communication" 
(Thomas 1992, 64).13 Zeno no longer needs the means of orality; writing enables the (partial) 
dismemberment of language and opens a pathway for the objectification of speech by means 
of writing and its concomitant separability from a speaker.  
The translational relation of Zeno to Parmenides seems to be constituted by varying 
tendencies, giving weight to the epithet ἀμφοτερογλώσσου (speaking from both sides) 
attached to him by Timon (Diogenes Laertius IX.5.25). On the one hand, it operates as a 
translational commitment to sustaining and making visible differences. In this sense the 
paradoxes render out of the song of Parmenides something productively different, another 
perspective on the questions of motion and division that form one aspect of the Parmenidean 
poem (e.g. Parmenides fr. 8.22-31). On the other hand, the Zenoan paradoxes can be – and 
have been – interpreted as attempts at laying bare the inner teaching, the doctrine of 
Parmenidean poem. Further translational reception takes its bearings from this latter tendency. 
Turning to Melissus of Samos, an eastern Aegean Greek island, the fact of the distance 
across which the poem traverses to reach Melissus, or that Melissus traverses to reach the 
poem, already bears a translative theme. There may have been a text circulated in the poetic 
form or as an epitome, or an oral transmission as performance or summary, or some 
                                                        
12 This image builds on van Wyke's account of the body/clothes metaphor and its implications for 
translation. Here the body is the clothing attiring the interior, what van Wyke calls "the location of our 
true identity," that, on his reading, can never be dissociated from its various representations, just as 
"original" and "translated" texts are bound together (van Wyke 2010, 39-40). 
13 Morgan develops this thought in her discussion of textualization and its role in the emergence of 
philosophy (Morgan 2000, 24-30).  
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combination of these. Or, Melissus might have travelled to Hyele-Elea and encountered any 
of these forms (or any combination thereof). 
Melissoan reception of the Parmenidean poem takes place primarily along the 
second of the two translational pathways. As Piergiacomi notes, a critical interpretation 
concerned with logical stringency can be understood as motivating Melissus's recalibration 
of the Parmenidean poem into an easily transportable doctrine (Piergiacomi 2014, 200-01). 
This aspect of Melissus's translation may testify to an albeit minor way in which the first 
translational pathway – the formation of diverse translations – is retained: while 
Parmenides does not prioritize logical stringency, but rather images and figures emblematic 
of complex reasoning generative of manifold resonance and register,14 Melissus takes the 
ideas in the direction of a prose without such literary features. As such, the Parmenidean 
poem finds an afterlife in the prosaic expressions of doctrine not received via theophany but 
posited through human reasoning and argumentation. 
The Melissoan translation of the Parmenidean poem will illustrate its mode. Here sounds 
the crisis (κρίσις) of being: 
The force of commitment will not allow 
generation from nothing, and Dikē therefore 
does not loosen her bonds 
to permit birth or destruction 
but holds fast. Here again is the critical [κρίσις] 
IT IS or IT ISN'T, and our decision has been 
to leave the latter unnamed, an unknowable nothing, 
not a true route at all, 
and to affirm the former as the authentic Way. 
Being does not get to be, either in time past or future: 
It would not BE if it did. 
In this way, 
birth is snuffed out and destruction unheard of (Parmenides, fr. 8.12-21; transl. Lom-
bardo 1982, 15-16; interpolation added). 
So Melissus translates: 
Whatever was always was and always will be. For if it came to be, it must have been 
nothing before it came to be. Now if it was nothing, in no way would anything come 
from nothing (Melissus fr. 1; transl. Graham 2010, 471). 
                                                        
14 These prioritized features perhaps are described by the σήματα of Parmenides fr. 8.2-3, which are 
multiple (πολλὰ μαλ'), poetic-imagistic, and semantically dense. 
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The translation dissolves the poetry of the Parmenidean song into a prosaic gloss that stakes 
out both a rejection of generation and a "strong kind of monism" (Graham 2010, 462). All 
the figures of the Parmenidean song – the horses (Parmenides fr. 1.1ff), the Heliades 
(Parmenides fr. 1.8-10), the singing Goddess (Parmenides fr. 1.24ff.), the two-headed 
mortals (Parmenides fr. 6.4-9), the anthropomorphized Dike and her shackles (Parmenides 
fr. 8.14), and more – and the song's narratological alienation and distancing of the very lines 
Melissus here translates are extinguished and fall into silence,15 "[a]s if translation, far from 
being the trials of the Foreign, were rather its negation, its acclimation, its naturalization" 
(Berman 2012, 241). Yet, it is precisely these poetic, literary elements whose polyvalent 
resonances send tremors of uncertainty and instability through the poem. 
In the Parmenidean poem a trial of the foreign is staged within its own limits, translating 
within itself "the relationship of the self-same (Propre) and the Foreign" (Berman 2012, 
240) through layers of oratio recta "as a mimesis of live speech within the context of live 
speech" (Bers 1997, 3),16 but also in its own shiftings, intra-linguistic translations on the 
very name of being, between πέλ- and εἶναι.17 In the introduction and presence of the 
Goddess' voice as "speech within speech" and in the ways in which that "secondary voice" 
entwines foreignness of the self-same with itself (Bers 1997, 7),18 the poem already 
activates the energies of l'épreuve de l'étranger: 
IT is indivisible [οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν], an homogeneous whole,  
not more in one place 
which would prevent its coherence 
and less in another 
a plenum of existence 
continuous gravitation of being towards being [ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει] (Parmenides fr. 
8.22-25; transl. Lombardo 1982, 16; interpolations added). 
                                                        
15 The narratological distance and alienation occurs in this passage, as others, in the attribution of the 
speech (both logos [Parmenides fr. 8.50] and mythos [Parmenides fr. 8.1]) to the Goddess (Parmenides fr. 
1.23). 
16 The "context of live speech" is performance. 
17 Smith reads this translation through Heidegger as voicing "what comes to pass...a kind of being that 
‘is' at rest within its ‘stirring,' ‘arising,' ‘coming to the fore'" (Smith 2003, 273-274). His attention falls 
mainly on the intra-linguistic translation at Parmenides fr. 6.8, though he mentions two other occurrences 
(Parmenides fr. 8.18, 11); he does not discuss the optative πέλοιτο (Parmenides fr. 8.19). 
18 The Goddess' addresses to the interlocutor suggest a dialogue, an atmosphere of orality. For his own 
reasons – namely, to highlight his interpretation that "ἐόν is not just available, it is what always compels 
and attracts mind" (Mourelatos 1970, 174) – and as one of many translations of the Parmenidean poem 
Mourelatos produces in his study, Parmenides fr. 8.38-41 is translated into a dialogic form.  
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With the uneven lines and line-breaks against the statements on homogeneity Lombardo's 
translation puts on view the self-estrangement of the Goddess' song.  
In the πελάζει formulation and the active condition spoken in -ιζω- verbs (Smyth 1984, 
245; §866), πελ- no longer bears a stillness in its arising, as Smith has thought it (Smith 
2003, 273-74); here it actively turns, resonant of the broad sea's ceaseless active motion 
(πέλαγος, πελάζει, πέλειν). Even as being does not differ from itself (οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν), 
its tidal pulls and swells turn it towards itself, performing the self-differentiation of reflexi-
vity and a self-translation from and into itself. Such intra-lingual translation surfaces most 
notably in the lines stressing sameness while fanning into diversity: 
ταὐτόν τ' ἐν ταὐτῶι τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται 
remaining the same and in the same [it] lies by itself [same] (Parmenides fr. 8.29; 
transl. Gallop 1984, 69; interpolations and underlining added) 
Heavy, spondaic opening feet in the hexameter, with five consecutive long syllables, draw 
attention to the sameness in repetition and its modulations attached to the dental -τ-, adding 
emphasis to the in-built differentiation of reflexivity and of translation. The second sense of 
Berman's trial comes forward in the poem's self-translations, as its language flashes its own 
"most distant from itself" (Berman 2012, 240).19 
Translating the Parmenidean poem, Melissoan philosophy minimizes the poem's a-
bundant foreignness. It appears that Melissus moved the poem towards the translating lan-
guage (prose) in his translational encounter, attempting to make an analysis of the other's 
thinking "down to its innermost core, to disregard the constitutive role played by a language 
and then, as it were through a new chemical process compound this ‘prelinguistic ' core with 
the essence and the power of another language" (Schleiermacher 2002, 234). Melissoan 
philosophy seems to attempt to move such a "prelinguistic core," not only prior to language 
but also "an unchangeable core or essence" (Arrojo 2018, 50),20 from poetry into prose.   
On the other hand, Melissus finds different outcomes from the idea of ungenerated and 
eternal being drawn from the Parmenidean poem: "Now since it did not come to be, but is, 
it always was and always will be, and it has no beginning nor end, but is unlimited 
[ἄπειρον]" (Melissus fr. 2; transl. Graham 2012, 471; interpolation added). As Graham has 
noted, working from the same starting point as Parmenides – that being is ἀγένητον (unge-
                                                        
19 See Jacobs' reading of αὐτός (same, self), which he takes to say "belonging together," as the center of 
the Parmenidean poem (Jacobs 1999, 186-87). 
20 Arrojo writes here on Plato from a transfiction perspective, drawing out the implications of a theory of 
forms and mimesis for translation, where the author's thought, the original text, and the translated text 
run parallel to the three removes articulated in Republic (Plato, Republic X.595c.7-597e.10).  
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nerated) and ἀνώλεθρόν (imperishable) (Parmenides fr. 8.3) – Melissus finds being unli-
mited (ἄπειρον) instead of limited (e.g. ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον [Parmenides fr. 8.42], ἐν 
πείρασι [Parmenides fr. 8.49; underlining added]), as the Parmenidean poem holds (Graham 
2012, 462). Piergiacomi articulates two further areas and ways in which Melissus diverges 
from Parmenides. Epistemologically, Melissus finds sensation inadequate as a source of 
knowledge because sensation bears a "natural unreliability…in perceiving Being and chan-
ge," whereas for Parmenides the opinions of mortals lead to misunderstanding and false 
belief (Piergiacomi 2014, 212). Theologically, in Piergiacomi's view Melissus gives argu-
mentation for an assumption operative in Parmenides concerning the divinity of being, but 
also concludes that the divine being is entirely separate from, as well as inactive and undis-
coverable in the empirical world, though it is discoverable through the efforts of human 
reason (Piergiacomi 2014, 213). 
To varying degrees and in different ways, both Zeno and Melissus translate the 
Parmenidean poem in a twofold manner. In one sense, their translational encounters with 
the Parmenidean poem generate an array of forms and emphases that hinges on the unsett-
led character of the poem. According to this mode, the translations perform active interven-
tions that charge the poem with a vital energy. In another sense, however, insofar as the 
former mode involves a dissolution of the form-content dynamics of the Parmenidean poem 
– shearing conceptual content from the dactylic hexameter form – that mode of translation 
lays the groundwork for the construction of a homogenous and stabilized doctrine separable 
from the poetry of the poem. 
 
3. Into the kerameikos 
  
Whereas Parmenides remains unnamed in the mode of translation as critical 
reception performed by Zeno and Melissus, Plato inaugurates a more forceful continuation 
of this protocol. With a translative gesture that renders Parmenides directly by name, Plato 
constructs the Eleatic thinker as a figure of his own philosophy. Valentine reads there a 
certain violence, a forced migration Plato imposes on Parmenides, relocating him to 
classical Athens and stripping the poem of its resonances with the local environment in 
southwest Italy (Valentine 2011, 29-30). In placing Parmenides within the orbit of dialogic 
philosophy and the centrality of Athens, Plato seems to enact an assimilative translation of 
Parmenides, or what Casanova has termed (about world literature and translation) an 
"annexation" that takes place as "a denial of difference" (Casanova 2010, 301). Involved in 
Plato's annexation is a division of thought and place that is of central concern to Valentine's 
study. Similarly, such a translative gesture unfolds as an intra-lingual version of 
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Schleiermacher's "author-to-reader" translation, in which the foreign becomes other than 
itself, familiar and no longer foreign (Schleiermacher 2002, 229): Plato moves the thinking 
of the Parmenidean poem into the more familiar language of Attic prose, as Melissus had 
done at Samos; more importantly, the thinking is no longer song, poetry. 
 On the other hand, the translative gesture of annexation is complicated by the 
manner in which Plato lets the Parmenidean poem reverberate into multiple outcomes of 
dialectic investigation, leaving room for the poem to be more and other than the translative 
elaborations: in the Parmenides, Plato has the character Parmenides engage in dialectics 
that identify eight variations on themes of being, unity, and plurality.21 Furthermore, the 
detachment Valentine notes is in the first place fictional, expressive of the twin aspects of 
action and play that constitute the drama of Platonic writing. Place is semantically active in 
the dialogue, though differently than in the Parmenidean poem. Within the fiction, place 
and movement activate some subtle tensions and implications. For example, those who seek 
out the drama are foreign to Athens, having arrived from Klazomenai in the Greek east 
(Plato, Parmenides 126a.1-b.4), while within the narration given by Antiphon – son of 
Purilampes (Πυριλάμπης) (Plato, Parmenides 126b.4), a very subtle gesture towards 
Parmenides's father Pyres (Πύρης) (Diogenes Laertius IX.3.21) – those who seek 
Parmenides and Zeno must travel to the western part of Athens (Plato, Parmenides 127c.1). 
These movements result in a curious reversal whereby the foreigners (Zeno and 
Parmenides) become the hosts, and an even more curious rendering of the foreign-hosts as 
foreign also to themselves by way of, and as a feature of, their own writings: Zeno's 
writings, a product of his youth, had been stolen and published involuntarily (Plato, 
Parmenides 128d.7-e1) –  Sauvage points to the Parmenides as a location of "la theme de la 
copie volée se rencontre notamment" (Sauvage 1973, 30); Parmenides is absent for much of 
the reading (Plato, Parmenides 127.c6-d5); the readings themselves become the energy for 
discussion beyond their limits, i.e. into foreign zones  of discourse (Plato, Parmenides 
127d.6ff), which Collins reads as a transitional moment in the Parmenides as it turns from 
repetition to dialectics (Collins 2010, 153 and n. 3). 
 The house lies beyond the city walls, evoking the passage through the gates of the 
paths of Night and Day (Parmenides fr. 1.11). In the kerameikos (Plato, Parmenides 
127c.1), which was a neighborhood and a burial ground, the Platonic translative gesture 
echoes with the movement of the Parmenidean poem's chariot from east to west, its 
downgoing (Parmenides fr. 1.8-21). Kingsley has emphasized the downward path of the 
Parmenidean journey by way of the poem's association with the world of the dead, bringing 
                                                        
21 On the complexities of Plato's translation of Parmenides in the dialogue, see Palmer 2009, 191-92. 
LABYRINTH Vol. 21, No. 2, Winter 2019 
 
 
72 
 
out a cluster of evidence in favor of Persephone as the poem's goddess: the common 
location – beyond the paths of the gates of Night and Day – in archaic poetry; paintings 
from Hyele-Elea, contemporary with Parmenides, depicting Persephone greeting Herakles; 
the particular importance of Persephone in and around Hyele-Elea; inscriptions and 
dedications to Persephone; the archaic Temple of Persephone at Rome and its Elean 
priestesses (Kingsley 1999, 93-100, 233-34). Situating the dialogue in proximity to that 
region, among the dead, adds nuance to Plato's interpretation and representation of the 
Parmenidean poem, as Whitaker has also observed (Whitaker 1996, 23-24). 
 The kerameikos was also the starting point of the great civic-religious procession in 
Athens. The Panathenaia was the chief ritual in which the Athenians reaffirmed their 
connection to and citizenship in the polis of Athens. That is, moving as it did from west to 
east, from extremity to center, from death to life, the Panathenaiac procession led each 
citizen and the community as a whole from death, through the mundane and ordinary 
activities of life in the polis, to a sacred mountain at the heart of the city.22 There the 
principal tutelary goddess was presented with the peplos and other offerings, renewing the 
sacred and ancient bond between humans and the goddess. Arriving thus at the center and 
peak of the polis, Athenians gave themselves to a life beyond their own, private lives, a life 
as citizens of the Athenian polis.23 
 The journey of the Parmenidean poem makes similar movements, seeking the 
Goddess and a relationship with the divine beyond the ordinary, far from the path of men 
(Parmenides fr. 1.27), perhaps with the goddess Athena. Miranda interprets several 
fragmentary inscriptions as dedicated to Athena and Zeus, for the former pointing back to 
Phokaia's Temple to Athena, and suggests that "i Focei, fuggiti dalla loro patria, 
trapiantassero o fondassero a Velia un cult di Athena e Zeus Hellenii," recalling that the 
Phokaians were among the nine Ionian cities that established sanctuaries at Egyptian 
Naukratis (Miranda 1982, 168). She also interprets indicia of Athena found at the site to 
suggest not Athenian influence but rather "l'ambiente religioso eleate" (Miranda 1982, 164). 
Athena figures also into Valentine's range of identities radiantly surrounding the poem's 
goddess (Valentine 2011, 109). 
 In Plato's Parmenides the destination is the home of Antiphon, a man concerned, 
like his grandfather, with horsemanship (Plato, Parmenides 126c.7-8, 127a.1-2), a subtle 
                                                        
22 This point has been inferred from Will Freiert's lecture, particularly from his metaphorical use of the 
journey from the city towards the academy by way of, or through, the cemetery (Freiert 2004). 
23 The information on the Panathenaia presented here is based on Neils 1992, 13-27; Mikalson 1976, 
149-51; Hornblower and Spawforth 2003, s.v. "Panathenaia." 
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literary detail attaching the scene to the horses of the Parmenidean poem (Parmenides fr. 1). 
Horses are further emphasized by the fictional Parmenides himself: 
And yet I seem to be suffering something like that Ibyceian horse (δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ 
Ἰβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναι), which, as a prizewinner but old, is about to take part in a 
chariot race (ἅρματι) and, being experienced (ἐμπειρίαν), trembles (τρέμοντι) at what 
is about to happen. Ibycus says that he resembles the horse since, although he is so old 
and unwilling, Necessity forces him to fall in love (εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἰέναι) 
(Plato, Parmenides 136e9-137a.4; transl. Whitaker 1996, 36). 
In quoting the line from Ibycus Plato deepens associations with place: Ibycus began at 
Rhegion in Sicily, one of the several locations where the displaced community of 
Phocaeans landed before founding Hyele-Elea, home of Parmenides (Herodotus 1.166.3).  
 The connection of place also occurs at the level of the language and moves beyond 
horses to several elements of the Parmenidean poem echoing in Plato's reference to Ibycus: 
• the passive construction in which the horse is the agent; compare Parmenides fr. 
1.1. 
• the chariot (ἅρματι); compare the chariot (ἅρμα) of Parmenides fr. 1.5. 
• the horse's trembling (τρέμοντι); compare the straining (τιταίνουσαι) of horses in 
Parmenides fr. 1.5. 
• the presence of compulsion (ἀναγκάζεσθαι); compare ἀνάγκη in Parmenides fr. 
8.16, 30. 
• experience (ἐμπειρίαν); compare with the limit (πείρατος) in Parmenides fr. 
8.31.24 
• the presence of eros (ἔρωτα) as the destination towards which he is compelled; 
compare the erotic element at the center of the Doxa and first among divine beings 
(Parmenides fr. 13). 
 
Plato seems to be drawing attention emphatically to the similarities between the 
Parmenidean and Ibycean poems, linking the former to the cultural matrix of Western 
Greece by (translational) means of the latter. This puts on display a feature of early Greek 
philosophy and its "strategy of assimilation and inclusion by employing mythological 
figures and even poetic and narrative mythological elements." Such a strategy, articulated 
by Morgan, Plato and other early Greek philosophers mobilized from a position in a "new" 
                                                        
24 Experience entails limits, a notion embedded in the Greek words formed on -πειρ-. 
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cultural setting both to rival the old mytho-poetic discourse and to "dramatize the 
weaknesses that both these worlds share" (Morgan 2000, 28-29).25 
Turned another way, Athenian Plato has Parmenides perform the translational action 
from poetry to prose that Melissus carried out on the Parmenidean poem, reducing the 
poetry to prose.26 Parmenides is depicted not only translating the poem of Ibycus into prose, 
but also producing a self-translation into the dialectical idiom of Plato and into the dialect 
of Athens. The problem is not paraphrase or translation or misquotation – a typical practice 
for ancient philosophy, where interpolation and interpretation of texts take place without a 
"strict regard for verbatim accuracy or intellectual property" (Thomas 1992, 162) – but 
rather the homogenization of philosophic discourse into prose, even in a fictional dialogue 
and all its complexities, and the assignment of doctrine to the subject of translation. Put 
another way, the Parmenides stages a more intense version of a translational action in 
which the translation is signed in the name of the original author, concealing the translator's 
presence and, further, the translation itself: the problem of invisibility (see Berman 2012, 
241; Venuti 1995, chap. 1; Hermans 1996). This becomes especially clear when Plato's 
character Parmenides begins his engagement with Aristotle (Plato, Parmenides 137b.2-3). 
In the Parmenides, the layered images and literariness of Plato's writing perform a 
complex translation in the dialogue's presentation of Parmenides. Overall, in Plato's 
Parmenides the gestures and actions work in the two ways already operating in Zeno: first, 
the dialogue lets a variety of interpretations of the Parmenidean poem remain in play, so 
that Parmenides appears less a source of doctrine than of a way of thinking; second, in the 
implication that the thinking done in and as the Parmenidean poem can be translated 
simpliciter, that is, according to the "classical determination," into prose, Plato assumes a 
doctrine available to be translated. 
The problem resurfaces in the translation of Parmenides undertaken by Plato in the 
well-known passage from Theaetetus. With characteristic flourish, Plato layers the 
figuration of a Parmenidean doctrine of the one and static being by staging Parmenides as 
single and alone in the dramatic speech of the dialogue – alone against Protagoras, 
Heraclitus, Empedocles, Epicharmus, and Homer "the general" (Plato, Theaetetus 153a.2) – 
                                                        
25 One might also think about the strengths shared by those worlds; for instance, in both the Ibycean and 
Parmenidean poems and Plato's dialogues, the strength of similarity, simile, can be thoroughly felt. On 
Ibycean poetry, and this particular poem, see Davies 1986, 403. 
26 Robb regards this as central to Plato's translational protocol of Republic, particularly in the tenth book: 
the "counter-charm" protecting audiences depends on the translation of "those wondrous ancient verses 
into plain everyday prose" so that their deceptive powers are exposed (Robb 1994, 226). 
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and by formulating that doctrine in the negative within a re-enactment of Protagoras's 
teaching of oppositions, non-being, and flux: 
I will tell you, and it's definitely no lowly statement, that nothing, therefore, is one thing 
itself by itself [ὡς ἄρα ἕν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν], nor could you in any way 
correctly call it anything whatever, but if you address it as large it will also appear small, 
if heavy, light, and everything at all in this way, since nothing is either any one thing or 
of any one sort, but it's from rushing around and from motion and from blending into 
one another that all things come to be – we say they "are," not addressing them correctly, 
since nothing ever is but is always becoming. And in this regard let all those who are wi-
se be lined up together, except Parmenides [πάντες ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου 
συμφερέσθων]: Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles, and the top-notch poets in 
each sort of poetry, Epicharmus in comedy and in tragedy Homer, who in speaking of 
Ocean, progenitor of the gods with mother Tethys, has said that all things are offspring 
generated out of flowing and motion (Plato Theaetetus 152d.2-e.9; transl. Sachs 2004, 
30-31; interpolations added).27 
In the phrase ὡς ἄρα ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν ("nothing…is one thing itself by 
itself"), Plato issues a shadow of the Parmenidean phrase ταὐτόν τ' ἐν ταὐτωι τε μένον καθ' 
ἑαυτό τε κεῖται ("Remaining the same and in the same, [it] lies by itself" [Parmenides fr. 
8.29; transl. Gallop 1984, 69]) and leaves the doctrine in shadowed silence, unspoken and 
absent, but present as the shadow of what all others say. 
 Again, Plato' translation is complex, shadowing the Parmenidean song in a negative 
valence, available as what is not. Quietly and playfully Plato's translation disturbs the 
Parmenidean song's repeated apparent denial and affirmation of negation, such that "a 
statement," in Curd's interpretation-translation, "that purports to disclose being must be 
thoroughly positive with no negative elements at all" (Curd 1991, 252): 
ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι.  
The one – that [it] is, and that [it] cannot not be (Parmenides fr. 2.3; transl. Gallop 
1984, 55).28  
While Plato's presentation of the positive statement of being in relief may subject it to slight 
ridicule, insofar as the very statement itself as Parmenides sings it advances the negation it 
denies, it may also be a show of respect to the Elean thinker of being. For, Plato's 
translation makes Parmenides the standard against which all other thought is measured. 
                                                        
27 Another Platonic subtlety resonates in the συμφερέσθων of 152e.3, which gestures in the direction of 
Heraclitus (Heraclitus fr. 10: ...ὅλα καὶ οὐκ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον...) and follows 
immediately Parmenides's name. 
28 Repetitions: Parmenides fr. 6.1-2; fr. 7.1; fr. 8.9, 46.  
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 The alleged doctrine of Parmenides comes to light in a line of Theaetetus that has 
been construed as a variation on a line from the Parmenidean poem, though it is presented 
as an amalgam, attributed to "many a Melissus and Parmenides:"  
 οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ' εἶναι 
Since it is wholly motionless, being is the name for the all (Plato, Theaetetus 180e.1; 
transl. Sachs 2004, 76).29 
This translates the Parmenidean line: 
οὖλον ἀκίνητόν τε ἔμεναι· τῷ παντ' ὄνομ(α) ἔσται 
To be whole and changeless; wherefore it has been named all things (Parmenides fr. 
8.38; transl. Gallop 1984, 71).30 
Plato's phrasing provides an example, perhaps, of the kind of memory characteristic of 
orality that concentrates on "the sequence of arguments" rather than a phrase or passage 
verbatim (Lentz 1989, 92; see also Thomas 1992, 162). The reduction to doctrine involves 
here silencing all the poem's images and figures that work in various ways to create internal 
dissonance with this very proposition.31 
Socrates speaks the composite translation then translates it to prose as follows: that all 
things are one and it stands still in itself, having no place in which it moves (Plato, 
Theaetetus 180e.3-4; transl. Sachs 2004, 76). 
Here Socrates translates a twofold doctrine of singularity of being and its accompanying 
stasis. Putting in view a haphazard quotation attributed across multiple thinkers – across 
poetic and prosaic thinking – and following that with a further prose translation that 
encapsulates in a single statement what many thinkers and thinkings thoroughly assert 
(διισχυρίζονται), the reduction of manifold into singular restates the translational protocol 
motivated by an attempt to extract and "to communicate as quickly as possible the thing 
underlying the words, to reveal the unity of being under the differences of languages, to 
reduce multiplicity to the singular" (Cassin 2010, 19). 
In Plato's student Aristotle the history of philosophy seems to begin as a text-based 
enterprise and its problematic, though characteristic, doxographic quality (Nightingale 
                                                        
29 Sachs comments on this line that "Socrates seems not so much to be misquoting as engaging in free 
variation on a theme" (Sachs 2004, 76, n. 39) 
30 The text here is from Sauvage (1973, 62); a variant (ὀνόμασται in place of ὄνομ(α) ἔσται) occurs in 
the line's last foot. 
31 On internal dissonances, or tensions, in the Parmenidean poem, see Marciano (2008), Cherubin 
(2017), Spitzer (2020). 
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2007, 169-173; Fränkel 1975, 258-59; Robb 1994, 214-251; Thomas 1992, 92; Jaeger 
1947, 7), even as it depends and builds on a textual history already underway. Mansfeld's 
study into historiography of early Greek philosophy has illustrated that Aristotle both 
receives and transmits particular readings – translations – of the Parmenidean poem, 
making use of existing doxographic sources that classified archaic thinking in various ways 
while adjusting them through his own philosophic engagements with them. Already by the 
fifth century BCE Protagoras, Hippias, and Gorgias produced compendia of earlier 
thinkings: Gorgias's presentation was oriented by a "systematical point of view," while 
Hippias arranged thinkers in relation to questions, and Protagoras's collection, as Mansfeld 
views it, aimed specifically at a critical assessment of Eleatic monism (Mansfeld 1990, 25, 
27).  
At once accepting and establishing a doctrinal reading of the poem, Aristotle 
disqualified Parmenides from the thinking of physics on the grounds that the thought of 
being as a static unity cannot be a source or origin (ἀρχή) because a source entails 
differentiation, multiplicity (Aristotle, Physics 185a.3-5). That is, from the point of view in 
Physics, if the static unity of the Parmenidean poem gave rise to some other thing it would 
be self-destructive on two counts: it would erase its own singularity; it would be involved in 
the change of generation. However, as Finkelberg has observed (Finkelberg 1990, 103-04), 
elsewhere Aristotle gives a more nuanced and generous reading of Parmenides as 
advancing a vision of unity according to the logos (κατὰ τὸν λόγον; Aristotle, Metaphysics 
986b.19).32 On the other hand, Aristotle's treatment, outlined by Finkelberg, is grounded in 
a distinction between "formal" and "material" unity, performing the kind of interpretation 
Fränkel understands in Aristotle's and Theophrastos's activity that translates with a view to 
"working out the details of their own doctrine" (Fränkel 1975, 259).  
Doctrine emerges from translational readings that stabilize and assign to thinkers 
unshifting thoughts in place of sinuous thinkings. As a translational action, doctrine reduces 
complexity and asserts identity of thinking and thought, of thought with itself: it takes place 
as the philosophy of the same. This has been termed "essentialism" and, in translation 
theory, has been aligned with Plato (Arrojo 2010, 247-48; Berman 2012, 252-53; van Wyke 
2010). Van Wyke links a notion of "ideal form" with "original works" whose "‘essence ' is 
treated with a reverence similar to that which Socrates shows towards forms" (van Wyke 
                                                        
32 Citing Aristotle, Metaphysics 986b.27 and 984b.2 for the unity in definition that enables the "sensible 
manifold," the harmony of Doxa and Aletheia (Finkelberg 1990, 103-04). Also, see Mansfeld, who 
imagines Aristotle generating a later and more nuanced reading of the Parmenidean poem by the time of 
Metaphysics, which he takes to explain the different treatments found between that text and Physics 
(Mansfeld 1990, 26). 
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2010, 32). However, reading along these lines hypostasizes and homogenizes a text by 
practicing an "effacement of differences" – an inherent feature of translation according to 
Paul Bandia, though not immune to forms of resistance under the sign of "heterogenization" 
(Bandia 2012, 423-24). That is to say, critique of essentialism folds into its own essentialist 
movement by extracting and presenting philosophic doctrine,33 as it must do under the 
compulsion of metaphysics and "the medium of the concept" (Adorno 1973, 406). Yet, 
following Adorno, that "magic circle" will not be undone by referring essentialism to itself, 
but instead will take another turn into a "micrology" whose action produces fissures in the 
identity yielded by the translational action of subsumption (Adorno 1973, 407-08). Thus, to 
assert that "Plato's is a philosophy of sameness" is to excise much important complexity 
and to reperform that impulse towards stabilized identity that animates the criticism (van 
Wyke 2010, 20). In the translational and translative movements of Plato, Zeno, and 
Melissus on the level of the micrologic Parmenidean thinking appears to continue its 
resistance to essentialism itself even as it produces the conditions for its formulation. 
 
4. The Ghost 
 
 After a quietus in late antiquity during which a fully textualized and 
instrumentalized Parmenidean poem is mobilized in lines or sections to bolster the concerns 
of whoever happens to be making use of the text (Cordero 1987, 5), the practice of 
collecting the writings of archaic Greek thinkers resurges in early Renaissance Europe in 
the prolific activity of Henri Estienne, known as Henricus Stephanus, whose pagination of 
the Platonic corpus still forms the standard means by which to cite Plato's texts. That is, this 
practice renews the translational action of philosophic historiography traced by Mansfeld 
(1990) to its pre-Platonic beginnings. Yet, under the new conditions of the sixteenth century 
the task is translated: by producing Poesis Philosophica at Geneva in 1573, the first effort 
to extract the poem from the "‘véhicules' d'un texte perdu" (Cordero 1987, 8),34 Stephanus 
institutes a philological drive towards a singularity. Lloyd-Jones sees in the emergence of 
such veneration for originals a characteristic of Renaissance philological and translational 
practice rooted, on his reading of Stephanus, in the figure of the vox universalis that 
                                                        
33 This mode also enacts some of the "deforming tendencies" identified and analyzed by Berman, 
perhaps without the controls he sees as necessary for possible liberation from forces and impulses that 
are unconscious and ontologically inscribed on translators and cannot be escaped "merely by becoming 
aware of them" (Berman 2012, 242). 
34 The translational layers begin to accumulate, as texts become conveyors (translations) of other texts 
that translate the vox universalis into the ipsissima verba.  
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transcends rational and linguistic categories yet forms an intimate connection with the 
words in which it is spoken or written. Certain original words, ipsissima verba, enable 
access to the vox, which leads Stephanus towards a commitment to "lexical precision" 
pivoting between a "linguistic obligation toward the authority of the source language, and a 
conceptual service rendered to, and shaped by, the target language's inherent 
insufficiencies" (Lloyd-Jones 1994, 2).35  
The path down to Diels and other philological presentations of the Parmenidean 
poem now opens as an attempt at "restoring the pristine qualities of material that the 
passage of time, like all other kinds of transformation, has altered" (Lloyd-Jones 1994, 6). 
On the other hand, that impulse to restore involves preservation, with the result that the 
poem's language remains in view, endowed with special value and significance. Though 
Diels recognizes that elements of the Parmenidean poem are lost irretrievably, particularly 
its dialect and its "künstliche und conventionelle Dichtersprache," he nevertheless sees as 
the task of philological effort to restore "den Codex des Aristoteles" (Diels 1897, 26-27). 
This elevation of an original generates the ambivalent character of the translational moment 
inaugurated in Renaissance Europe, given a negative complexion in terms of failure and 
loss, or, in the case of Stephanus as Lloyd-Jones sees it, of "regret and resignation" that 
might encapsulate a history of translation in the west told as a narrative of the translators' 
experience (Lloyd-Jones 1994, 11).36  
A predominant mode of philosophic translation oriented towards reproduction of the 
same appears to diverge from the pathway open for philology, reimaging the "tension" 
between the two disciplines as a schism. For much of philosophy insists on the separability 
of ideas from language; indeed, Derrida thinks this detachability as "philosophy's unique 
thesis" (Derrida 1982, 229). Within the strain of dialectics in Hegel's Vorlesungen der 
Geschichte der Philosophie this insistence and its manifestation seize early Greek thinking 
in the movements towards synthesis. From the outset, the sweep of dialectics generates "the 
Eleatics" within which Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus are gathered. On 
Aristotle's recommendation the latter, Melissus, is eliminated from further consideration: 
"es sei nichts Bestimmtes durch ihn hervorgetreten" (Hegel 1989, 49).  
                                                        
35 NB: the page numbers refer to the digital version of this article and do not correspond to those of the 
original publication. 
36 See also Arrojo's treatment of the various ways such negative complexion has been applied to 
translators (Arrojo 2006, 92-95). Venuti sees this complexion in psychoanalytic terms as characterized 
by identification or repression and carried out as "a weird self-annihilation" (Venuti 1995, 7-8); he is 
dealing with twentieth century CE examples. "Invisibility,' 7-8. Rée thinks of the situation in terms of 
deprivation (Rée 2001, 223).  
LABYRINTH Vol. 21, No. 2, Winter 2019 
 
 
80 
 
 After translating biographies into a composite narrative of each of the remaining 
three Eleatics, Hegel enters the "reineres Feld" on which the principal teaching 
(Hauptlehre) can be seen: "Es ist nur Eine, das Sein; alles andere hat keine Wahrheit, ist nur 
Meinung, Schein" (Hegel 1989, 51). Again the dialectical movement surfaces in the rapid 
move away from particularities of place and biographic minutiae and into the Hauptlehre. 
As translational mode, elimination constitutes the task. Elimination entails identification 
and selection and the production of schisms on the fabric of history. In action, the second 
dialectical moment of Hegel's translation carves philosophy out of and away from history: 
after completing the translation of Zeno's biography, Hegel introduces philosophy in the 
purified field, i.e. the region of philosophy demarcated from that of bodies, "colonization," 
particular cities. After this, Hegel can begin: "Was nun die Philosophie der Eleaten 
anbetrifft, so treten wir hier in ein reineres Feld" (Hegel 1989, 51). This open country, Feld, 
is more pure (reineres) than the political fray Hegel has just translated concerning Zeno and 
the tyrannicide at Hyele-Elea. 
 Through dialectics Being and One translate one another with no remainder and no 
friction as full presence obtains across the terms das Sein, das Eine, τὸ ὄν, τὸ ἕν (Hegel 
1989, 52).37 The initial translation, rendered a moment in dialectical inquiry, accumulates 
through the translational work and reaches another stage in the phrase "Das Wahrhafte ist 
nur das Eine, das Sein. Alles andere ist nicht." All the poetry of Xenophanes and 
Parmenides, all the richness, the subtleties and interplay of images in Zeno's paradoxes, 
these form the mere excess and matter that has been shorn from the innermost, "der 
allgemeine Satz der Eleaten" (Hegel 1989, 67). Dialectics has churned these as concepts as 
it also has churned the thinkers out of the initial synchronic presentation (where this 
translation of equivalence occurs) into a diachronic relation, so that Xenophanes is 
eliminated, then Parmenides, until the final paragraphs of the chapter feature Zeno alone. 
The two temporal relations then dialectically converge such that Zeno and Kant form a 
dialectical pair, with the greater achievement bestowed on the former for his reformulation, 
his translation through Hegel's translation, into a subjective, but not yet objective, 
configuration of the dialectic: "Die Welt ist an ihr selbst das Erscheinen, und nur das Eine 
Sein ist das Wahre" (Hegel 1989, 69). In the chapter's synthetic movement Eine and Sein 
have been translated into a synthesized substantive that bears, even through all the magic of 
                                                        
37 Venuti articulates the importance of the remainder from the standpoint of translation theory as 
deviations from standardized or the "major form" of a language that disrupt the dominant form (Venuti 
1998, 10). 
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dialectics, the markings of the elemental translation of the philosophic poem of Parmenides 
into doctrine, the core available to any language. 
 For moderns, Nietzsche gives a typically caricatured and inventive translation of the 
twofold doctrine of stasis and unity. After styling Parmenides as having formed into a type 
of a prophet "formed of ice rather than fire, pouring cold piercing light all around" who 
achieves a "bloodless abstraction" (Nietzsche 1962, 69), Nietzsche develops a biography of 
Parmenides to reconcile the apparent gap between cosmology and ontology in the 
Parmenidean poem. Unlike Hegel, for whom the residue of history constitutes impurity and 
must be purified through dialectics, Nietzsche translates Parmenides with reference to 
biography. On the other hand, the biography Nietzsche embeds in his critical translation is 
the product of his own imagination, a fiction that serves a purpose in translating the text to 
itself, spanning the distance between Alētheia and Doxa. 
 Moving through and across the seemingly incongruous parts of the poem, Nietzsche 
attends, unfolds, and translates the conventional doctrinal reading: 
It can be neither infinitely large nor infinitely small, for it is perfect, and a perfectly 
given infinity is a contradiction. Thus it hovers: bounded, finished, immobile, every-
where in balance, equally perfect at each point, like a sphere, though not in space, for 
this space would be a second existent. There cannot be several existents. For in order 
to separate them, there would have to be something which is not existent, a suppositi-
on which cancels itself. Thus there is only eternal unity (Nietzsche 1962, 78).      
In Nietzsche's reading Parmenides performs the basic operation of philosophy that persists 
and determines its very activity, formalized in Plato and carried on in the history of 
philosophic thinking, the division of the noetic and the aesthetic fields that "lies upon 
philosophy like a curse" (Nietzsche 1962, 79). Doctrine emerges from the translational 
protocol that silences and represses language's "own foreignness to itself" in order to render 
a text into a veneer of glassine ice, "to make it," as Barbara Johnson has put it, "the 
transparent expression of a great philosophical thought," a protocol Johnson sees as 
constitutive of Western philosophy (Johnson 1985, 146-47). In this spirit, Kahn takes the 
so-called proem,38 to be a "transparent" allegory of Parmenides's "quest for knowledge." 
Seeing through the transparent allegory and translating it will make possible on his view a 
"correct interpretation of his thesis" (Kahn 1969, 704). 
 The doctrinal translation and reception of the Parmenidean poem guides editions for 
and by philosophers seeking to study the poem-as-text. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield have 
                                                        
38 For a sound challenge to understanding the opening scene of the Parmenidean poem as a "proem," see 
Havelock 1958. 
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conditioned many readers of the Greek text with their bilingual (Greek- English) edition, 
which disrupts "fragments" in order to gloss and outline the arguments. The summary of the 
poem's "radical and powerful" argument follows the conventional lines: Parmenides 
"proves in an astonishing deductive tour de force that if something exists, it cannot come to 
be or perish, change, or move, nor be subject to any imperfection" (Kirk, Raven, and 
Schofield 1983, 241). Graham's recent edition includes similarly conventional commentary, 
reinforcing the doctrinal reading of the song (Graham 2010, 203-04). The philosophic mode 
of translation seems to rely on a presumed "ease of accessibility to the meaning(s) of the 
original text that ignores the inevitable interpretations and alterations that are a result of its 
translation into another language" (Batchelor 2010, 49-50). Through this translational "ease 
of accessibility" doctrine is established and reinforced. 
 
Conclusions 
 
From archaic Greece to the present the ambiguities of the Parmenidean poem have 
been translated into certainties of doctrine, the literary dimensions into secondary qualities 
of a primary substance: prosaic philosophic thinking and its law of non-contradiction. Prose 
that intends a reduction of other texts and thinkers to a doctrine or set of doctrines – already 
forming in the Melissoan translations – inaugurates a translational protocol that constructs 
stabilized doctrine and depends on its portability through languages, cultures, places, i.e., 
its detachment from history. Beneath the gaze of a philosophy of self-sameness unity and 
stability, translated into doctrine, conflict with diversity and motion – a conflict perhaps 
characteristic of philosophy, which in Morgan's view prefers the former pair (Morgan 2000, 
36). While each translation and translative gesture renders a complex figure, the movement 
seems oriented towards reducing the Parmenidean poem to a stable doctrine and 
diminishing the song's polyvalence.  
Yet translation, even as it renders such profound changes on the Parmenidean song, 
bears within itself a capacity to reimagine and to reawaken the poem as "an open ended 
dialogue rather than the pursuit of one ultimate truth" (Batchelor 2010, 46). Another branch 
in the early moments of the translational history of the Parmenidean poem performs such a 
reawakening by way of the diversifying aspect of the translational mode at work in Zeno, 
Melissus, and Plato without a reduction to doctrine. From southwest Italy to the southern 
Sicilian polis of Akragas (modern Agrigento), the Parmenidean poem is translated by a 
mode of like-to-like in the poem of Empedocles. As with the translations of Zeno and 
Melissus, the Empedoclean poem does not explicitly assign doctrine to Parmenides. Rather, 
in a graceful encounter in which figures engage with other figures the Empedoclean poem 
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adds to a Heraclitean translational action where the harmonies and disharmonies resound 
(Heraclitus, frs. 8, 10, 51), opening areas of difference(s) in which thinking might enjoy its 
movements from many to one and – vitally, urgently, energetically – from one to many 
(Heraclitus, fr. 10).  
Some pedagogical implications flow from a heightened attention to translation (in 
broad and narrow senses) as woven into the fabric of philosophy's history. To the extent that 
doctrine comes to be established via translation(s), approaches to teaching history of 
philosophy can attempt to reanimate texts by releasing them from the encasements of what 
have become conventional, doctrinal interpretations – disrupting one form of what Hix has 
called "translation inertia" (Hix 2019). Without the assignment of doctrine in advance of 
interpretive-translational encounters, texts can circulate among readers in more fluid ways, 
ways that can both surprise and delight readers – instructors and students – if they remain 
open to those movements. On the part of faculty this approach calls for a re-evaluation, a 
willingness to be learners more than knowers.39 This approach does not foreclose the 
possibility of knowledge but rather emphasizes the processual and relational aspects of 
knowledge as knowing, an activity in progress or, to borrow from Cassin, not as ergon but 
as energeia (Cassin 2010, 27). Translation serves to issue a critical reminder of this ongoing 
activity of philosophy, the continual reconfigurations of its concepts in and through 
language(s) as "a process of interaction with the other – other thought, other language, other 
culture" replete with ethical implications (Avtonomova 2020, 108). 
These closing remarks do not recommend a cessation of critical, prosaic, scholarly 
interpretation. Rather, the recommendation is for greater awareness of the translational 
action inherent to such interpretation and for attempts to balance the prosaic with other 
interpretive-translational forms. In the lights of multiple and different translational 
approaches the Parmenidean poem, as well as other canonical texts of philosophy, might 
shine in more brilliant and more subtle ways. 
 
Dr. D. M. Spitzer, Department of Communication, Humanities, and the Arts 
Harrisburg Area Community College, Pennsylvania, USA, dmspitze[at]hacc.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
39 Grateful appreciation to D. H. Saussy for conversing on this point. 
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